Winnicott, Playing and Reality (1971)

Winnicott is perhaps the only post-Freudian psychologist who is interested in the ontology of the self. He posits the existence of a third “potential” creative space in between internal and external reality through which the infant makes the transition from what Freud would call “primary narcissism” (state of undifferentiated fusion with the mother) to a sense of the self as separate but linked with the external world. The transitional object “belongs to the realm of illusion which is at the basis of experience. This early stage in development is made possible by the mother’s special capacity for making adaptation to the needs to her infant, thus allowing the infant the illusion that what the infant creates really exists” (19). Winnicott perceives of the infant’s ego development in terms of stages:

1. Oneness. Self= breast. This exists prior to the transitional stage.
2. Illusion created through symbolization. No sense of inside/outside, me vs not-me. Transitional stage. The transitional object is located in between inner and outer reality, as it is perceived as belonging neither to his body nor to the external world. Although the transitional object is a symbol for the mother- breast, its not being the mother-breast is just as important for the infant’s purposes.
3. Passage from object-relating to object-use (“playing with reality”) through destruction and survival of the object. A sense of separateness, of me and not me boundaries, evoves, resulting from the mother’s failure to always meet her child’s needs and from the child’s impulses; the infant can now relate to the mother as an object of projective identifications. If the mother “survives” (does not retaliate against) the child’s destruction of her subjectivity qua fantasy, then the child internalizes the “good enough mother” and develops the capacity to creatively use objects, which is the foundation of creative living and culture. This implies, on the part of the subject, an ability to play with the boundary between fantasy or fiction and reality.

*“Destruction” then does not mean rage at the mother in a Kleinian sense, whereby the infant resents the breast for failing to always satisfy his needs, but is coextensive with object-relating, projective identifications.

*Object-use incorporates but goes beyond object-relating; it involves an awareness of the mother’s separate subjectivity and of the externality of phenomena. At the same time, the subject can represent narcissistic fantasy (e.g., idealization, destruction) in play. In Winicott’s words: “Object-relating is an experience of the subject that can be described in terms of the subject as an isolate. When I speak of the use of an object, however, I take object-relating for granted and add new features that involve the nature and behavior of the object. For instance, the object, if it is to be used, must necessarily be real in the sense of being part of shared reality, not a bundle of projections. It is this, I think, that makes for the world of difference that there is between relating and usage.” (118)

Earlier Winnicott writes that “in object-relating the subject allows certain alterations in the self to take place, of a kind that has caused us to invent the term ‘cathexis.’ The object has become meaningful. Projection mechanisms and identifications have been operating, and the subject is depleted to the extent that something of the subject is found in the object, though enriched by feeling. Accompanying these changes is some degree of physical involvement (however slight) towards excitement, in the direction of the functional climax of an organism.”

Hence, with this notion of a third potential space, Winnicott revises Freudian/Kleinian assumptions and adds an intersubjective dimension to the intrapsychic one, exploring how the mother-environment affects the development of the ego:

1) aggression as innate to the subject, resulting from the clash of instincts with reality principle. Winnicott writes: “There is no anger in the destruction of the object to which I am referring, though there could be said to be joy at the object’s survival” (125). Destructive impulses do not arise when the reality principle frustrates instinctive drives; rather, the reality principle is created out of destruction (of the subjective object).

2) of narcissism as an intrapsychic, destructive phenomenon. Winnicott places importance on the responsiveness of the environment to the child’s need to find himself through creative processes. Narcissism (both primary and secondary, in Freudian parlance) must be encouraged in order for the self to acknowledge alterity, otherness; it is the basis of creativity, which involves playing with reality (rather than a retreat into fantasy).

3) of the death drive as primary. If the transitional space is what provides the foundation for the drives, then it would be anachronistic to postulate an innate death drive (Trieb).

Limitations of Winnicott’s work:

1. Ahistorical notions of what constitutes “good enough mothering,” that stress the importance of breastfeeding and the infant’s need for a constant maternal presence.
2. Ontologization of gender: associates “male” with doing (object-relating) and “female” with being (equation of me with not me, baby with mother’s breast).
3. Failure to consider the mother’s point of view, to incorporate it into his explanation of the holding environment. This failure undermines the intersubjective aspect of his work.